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1 
WHAT ALL THE FUSS ISN’T ABOUT: THE 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S MISAPPREHENSION 
OF APA PURPOSES IN HAWKES CO. v. U.S. 
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
Abstract: On April 10, 2015, in Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers jurisdictional determination made pursuant to the Clean Water 
Act is subject to judicial review as final agency action under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. Jurisdictional determinations are threshold decisions of 
the Corps assessing whether a piece of land is subject to regulation under the 
Clean Water Act. The Eighth Circuit’s decision contradicts a previous decision 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held pre-enforcement 
judicial review of Corps jurisdictional determinations improper under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. This Comment argues that the Eighth Circuit’s 
analysis inappropriately relied on the costs of permitting under the Clean Wa-
ter Act. This Comment urges the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision and to follow instead the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit. Not 
only would the Eighth Circuit’s decision in this case disrupt the system of re-
view in place for agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, it 
would complicate jurisdictional jurisprudence by creating two discrete sets of 
jurisdictional case law subject to different standards of review in the courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides inter-
ested parties with the right to judicial review of final agency action.1 De-
termining when any given agency action is final, and thus eligible for Chap-
ter 7 review, has proven difficult for the courts.2 In 2015, in Hawkes Co. v. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Government Organization and Employees, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 392 (1966) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed 
in 1946, makes uniform the creation and enforcement of agency regulations across many disparate 
U.S. agencies with often divergent goals. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 
79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); S. REP. NO. 79-752, 
at 187–89 (1945). 
 2 Compare Jama v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 760 F.3d 490, 497 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding in-
termediate decision terminating refugee status by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services not 
reviewable under Chapter 7 until the conclusion of the proceedings), and Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding Fish and Wildlife Service recom-
mended survey protocols insufficiently final to receive Chapter 7 review), with Sharkey v. Quar-
antillo, 541 F.3d 75, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding Immigration and Naturalization Service’s District 
Adjudications Officer’s cancellation of plaintiff’s immigration status reviewable under Chapter 7). 
2 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1 E. Supp. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit considered the application of Chapter 7 review to the jurisdictional 
determinations of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) when en-
forcing the regulations of the Clean Water Act of 1977 (“CWA”).3 The 
CWA is designed to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation’s waters 
by requiring permits for discharging pollutants into U.S. waters.4 When the 
Corps makes a jurisdictional determination under the CWA, it decides as a 
threshold matter whether or not a piece of property is subject to the CWA.5 
Interested parties seek pre-enforcement judicial review of adverse jurisdic-
tional determinations because land within the scope of the CWA requires 
expensive permitting through the Corps for most industrial uses, while land 
falling outside the scope of the CWA requires no such permitting.6 The ju-
risdictional reach of the CWA has remained an open question.7 
                                                                                                                           
See generally Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1285, 1287, 1329–40 (2014) (discussing the policy implications of expanding or narrowing judi-
cial review of agency action). 
 3 See Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Hawkes II), 782 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir.), 
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (mem.). A jurisdictional determination is a threshold decision 
by the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) as to whether a piece of property is subject to the ju-
risdiction of the Clean Water Act of 1977 (“CWA”). See 33 C.F.R. § 331.2 (2015). The Army 
Corps of Engineers is an executive branch agency governed by the procedural rules of the APA. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) (defining “agency” for purposes of the APA); NICOLE T. CARTER & 
BETSY A CODY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20866, THE CIVIL WORKS PROGRAM OF THE ARMY 
CORPS OF ENGINEERS: A PRIMER 1 (2005) (explaining that the Corps is an executive branch agen-
cy and part of the Department of Defense). 
 4 See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 1251 (2012)). Under the CWA, discharging any pollutant, whether radioactive waste or 
cellar dirt, into the navigable waters of the United States is unlawful without a permit allowing 
such discharge. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1362 (2012). The statute defines the navigable wa-
ters only as the waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362. 
 5 See 33 C.F.R. § 331.2. Land is subject to the jurisdiction of the CWA if it comprises waters 
of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362. 
 6 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion) (explaining the 
significant consequences of CWA enforcement regulations for property owners); see also David 
Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An As-
sessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 74–76 
(2002) (studying the time and expense of the CWA permitting process). 
 7 See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012). See generally Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757–
58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (outlining the recent back-and-forth of Corps regulations and Court 
decisions trying to define the reach of the CWA). Defining the bounds of the waters of the United 
States has long plagued the U.S. Supreme Court, the Corps, and property owners. See Sackett, 132 
S. Ct. at 1370. See generally Kenneth S. Gould, Drowning in Wetlands Jurisdictional Determina-
tion Process: Implementation of Rapanos v. United States, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 413 
(2008) (discussing the impact of lack of Supreme Court or regulatory guidance on CWA jurisdic-
tional determinations); Margaret “Peggy” Strand & Lowell M. Rothschild, What Wetlands Are 
Regulated? Jurisdiction of the S404 Program, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,372 
(2010) (providing a history of Corps and EPA regulations defining CWA wetland jurisdiction). 
When most recently faced with the question of the CWA’s scope, the U.S. Supreme Court nar-
rowed the reach of the CWA without a majority opinion to direct future assessments of scope. See 
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In Hawkes, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Corps jurisdictional de-
terminations are final agency actions eligible for judicial review under 
Chapter 7 prior to enforcement.8 In contrast, in 2014, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit determined in Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers that Corps jurisdictional determinations are not final agency actions 
and denied pre-enforcement judicial review.9 
This Comment argues that the Eighth Circuit incorrectly held that a 
Corps jurisdictional determination is a final agency action within the mean-
ing of Chapter 7 when it reversed the lower court’s opposite decision.10 This 
Comment argues that the Eighth Circuit’s reliance on CWA ambiguity in 
Hawkes was inappropriate and overextended the intended reach of Chapter 
7 review.11 Part I of this Comment outlines current Chapter 7 jurisprudence, 
the current state of CWA jurisdictional law, and the factual and procedural 
history of Hawkes.12 Part II examines the split between the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits in determining whether a Corps jurisdictional determination pursu-
ant to the CWA constitutes a final agency action under Chapter 7.13 Finally, 
Part III argues that the Eighth Circuit erred in granting pre-enforcement ju-
dicial review of the Corps’s jurisdictional determination under the CWA and 
that the U.S. Supreme Court should reverse the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
and deny Chapter 7 review.14 
                                                                                                                           
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). In Rapanos, Chief Justice Roberts noted his 
fears that the current state of law under the CWA leaves interested parties without guidance on 
Congress’s intended limits on the reach of the CWA. Id. (stating that the CWA leaves parties to 
“feel their way on a case-by-case basis”). 
 8 Compare Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1002 (holding Corps jurisdictional determination reviewa-
ble under Chapter 7 prior to enforcement), with Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 
383, 394 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying pre-enforcement Chapter 7 review of Corps jurisdictional de-
termination), cert. denied sub nom. Kent Recycling Servs. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. 
Ct. 1548 (2015) (mem.). 
 9 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 394 (denying pre-enforcement judicial review of Corps jurisdictional 
determination). 
 10 See infra notes 73–90 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 73–90 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–55 and accompanying text (outlining Chapter 7 jurisprudence and CWA 
jurisdictional law). 
 13 See infra notes 56–72 and accompanying text (examining the circuit split between interpre-
tations of the CWA). 
 14 See infra notes 73–90 and accompanying text (arguing that the Eighth Circuit erred in 
granting pre-enforcement judicial review under the CWA, and urging the U.S. Supreme Court to 
reverse). 
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I. CHAPTER 7 REVIEW, JURISDICTIONAL AMBIGUITY, AND HAWKES 
The Hawkes Company’s dispute with the Corps arises at the juncture 
of two legislative schemes: the CWA and the APA.15 Section A describes the 
current legal landscape for judicial review of final agency action under the 
APA.16 Section B introduces CWA jurisdictional law ambiguity.17 Section C 
traces the Hawkes Company’s case from its request for a jurisdictional de-
termination from the Corps to its appeal to the Eighth Circuit.18 
A. Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act as  
Held in Sackett v. EPA 
The APA governs the regulatory activities of federal agencies.19 Under 
Chapter 7 of the APA, a party may seek judicial review of an agency action 
only if it is made reviewable by statute or if it is a “final agency action for 
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”20 The text of the CWA 
does not provide explicitly for judicial review of jurisdictional determina-
tions.21 Therefore, pre-enforcement judicial review of jurisdictional deter-
minations made pursuant to the CWA is available to interested parties only 
if a jurisdictional determination is found to be a final agency action within 
the meaning of Chapter 7.22 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 999 (describing the multiple U.S. Supreme Court tests for CWA 
jurisdiction and the variety in Chapter 7 application). 
 16 See infra notes 19–34 and accompanying text (describing the standard for judicial review of 
final agency action under the APA). 
 17 See infra notes 35–43 and accompanying text (introducing CWA jurisdictional ambiguity). 
 18 See infra notes 44–55 and accompanying text (providing factual and procedural history of 
Hawkes II). 
 19 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (governing agency rule making). 
 20 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). The girth of the federal administrative state necessarily requires 
some flexibility in practice. See S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 189. But see generally Dru Stevenson & 
Sonny Eckhard, Standing as Channeling in the Administrative Age, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1357 (2012) 
(discussing agency autonomy in limiting suits against itself through policy choice). 
 21 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 387 (noting that no relevant law provides expressly for judicial re-
view). Jurisdictional determinations may be issued at the discretion of the agency and are often 
issued at a property owner’s request. See id.; Strand & Rothschild, supra note 7, at 10,374 (ex-
plaining the Corps practice of providing preliminary jurisdictional determinations); Sunding & 
Zilberman, supra note 6, at 64 (explaining the Corps practice of encouraging property owners to 
meet with the Corps before embarking on the permitting process); see also 33 C.F.R. pt. 331 app. 
C (2011) (diagramming process for approved jurisdictional determinations). 
 22 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 387–88 (noting that no relevant law expressly provides for judicial 
review of jurisdictional determinations and that the APA provides only for review of final agency 
actions in such circumstances). See generally Paula M. Feldmeier, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-
Issued Jurisdictional Determinations Post Sackett v. EPA: Are They Subject to Judicial Review?, 
A.B.A. WATER QUALITY & WETLANDS COMMITTEE NEWSL., May 2014 (discussing historical 
shift in the perception of the courts of the reviewability of Corps jurisdictional determinations). 
The jurisdictional determination could also receive judicial review during later Chapter 7 review 
of a subsequent permitting decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 704; Belle, 761 F.3d at 394. The APA allows 
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Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Bennett v. Spear, 
courts use a two-pronged test to assess the finality of agency action within 
the meaning of Chapter 7 (“Bennett test”).23 To constitute a final agency 
action, an administrative decision must (1) mark the consummation of the 
agency’s decision-making process, and (2) be an action by which rights or 
obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences will 
flow.24 The Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree as to the 
application of the second prong of the Bennett test to Corps jurisdictional 
determinations.25 
In 2012, in Sackett v. EPA, the Supreme Court applied this two-
pronged test to a compliance order issued by the EPA while enforcing the 
CWA.26 In order for a compliance order to be issued against a party, the 
EPA must determine that the non-compliant party’s property falls within the 
scope of the CWA and that their actions have violated the CWA’s prohibi-
                                                                                                                           
all intermediate agency actions to be reviewed by the courts during judicial review of a final agen-
cy action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling 
not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”). Because 
permitting decisions are entitled to judicial review as final agency actions, a party could appeal a 
jurisdictional determination underpinning a Corps permitting decision if they sought Chapter 7 
review of such permitting decision. See Belle, 761 F.3d at 394 (noting that the Belle Company 
would be able to challenge the CWA’s underlying jurisdiction if they were denied a permit and 
brought suit to challenge the permitting decision); 33 C.F.R. § 331.12 (2015) (allowing permit 
denials and proffered permits appeal to the federal courts). 
 23 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (establishing two-pronged test for de-
ciding whether an administrative action is sufficiently final to warrant judicial review under Chap-
ter 7 (“Bennett test”)). See generally Bagley, supra note 2 (discussing federal court review of 
agency actions). 
 24 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78 (setting out the two-pronged test for final agency action). 
The Bennett test addresses only the threshold finality inquiry and does not address whether the 
administrative action has any other adequate remedies in court. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (allowing judi-
cial review when agency action is final and without other adequate court remedy); Sackett, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1372 (addressing the question of other adequate remedies after applying the Bennett test). 
Because not all courts reach the adequate remedy inquiry when assessing whether an administra-
tive decision is eligible for Chapter 7 review, this Comment focuses on the finality inquiry. See 
Belle, 761 F.3d at 394 (concluding its Chapter 7 analysis without reaching the question of ade-
quate court remedy upon deciding that the agency action was not final under Bennett); Fairbanks 
N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a 
Corps jurisdictional determination is not an action by which rights or obligations have been de-
termined or from which legal consequences will flow, and then holding “[f]rom this it follows that 
judicial review under the APA is unavailable”). 
 25 Compare Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1001 (holding a jurisdictional determination meets the 
second prong of the Bennett test and is reviewable under Chapter 7), with Belle, 761 F.3d at 394 
(holding a jurisdictional determination of the Corps fails to meet the second prong for finality 
under Chapter 7). 
 26 See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371–72. Compliance orders are issued by the EPA when a party 
is discharging, or has discharged, pollutants into the waters of the United States without a permit 
or outside the bounds of a permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2012). The EPA may also bring en-
forcement actions. See id. 
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tions.27 An EPA compliance order asserts CWA jurisdiction even when the 
Corps has not issued a formal jurisdictional determination for a party.28 
In Sackett, a family who had filled their property in order to build a 
house was issued a compliance order by the EPA stating that they had filled 
the property in violation of the CWA.29 Without a statutory right to judicial 
review, the Sacketts sought review of the compliance order on the basis that 
it was a sufficiently final agency action for which judicial review was avail-
able under Chapter 7.30 
The Supreme Court held the EPA compliance order sufficiently final to 
receive Chapter 7 review because it satisfied both prongs of the Bennett 
test.31 As to the first prong, the Court held that the compliance order marked 
the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process because the 
Sacketts could not bring any further agency review of the issued order.32 
The EPA compliance order satisfied the second prong of the test because it 
obligated the property owners to an expensive restoration plan, imposed 
penalties for failure to restore, and effectively barred the building of their 
home.33 The only way for the Sacketts to contest the compliance order and 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (detailing EPA compliance order issuance procedure under the 
CWA). 
 28 See 33 C.F.R. § 331.2 (noting that compliance orders may include implicit jurisdictional 
assessments even without approved jurisdictional determination). An informal jurisdictional de-
termination of this sort is considered a preliminary, rather than approved, jurisdictional determina-
tion. Id. In Sackett, the Corps asserted findings of jurisdiction in the compliance order itself. See 
Administrative Compliance Order, EPA Docket No. CWA-10-2008-0014 at 1.4, 1.5 (Nov. 26, 2007). 
The compliance order issued in Sackett requires that an implicit jurisdictional determination was 
made that the Sacketts’ property is subject to the regulation of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319; 
EPA Docket No. CWA-10-2008-0014 at 1.4, 1.5. In Sackett, the plaintiffs sought to contest the 
underlying jurisdictional determination. See 132 S. Ct. at 1371. 
 29 Sackett v. EPA, No. 08-CV-185-N-EJL, 2008 WL 3286801, at *1–2 (D. Idaho 2008), aff’d, 
622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1367; see Complaint for Declaratory and Injunc-
tive Relief ¶¶ 6, 27, Sackett, No. 08-CV-185-N-EJL, 2008 WL 2814724. 
 30 See Sackett, 2008 WL 3286801, at *2. The compliance order issued against the Sacketts 
required they restore the property according to an EPA work plan or face up to $70,000 per day in 
civil fines for the violation. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 29, ¶ 35; 
EPA Docket No. CWA-10-2008-0014 at 1.4, 1.5. 
 31 See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371–72. 
 32 Id. at 1372. 
 33 Id. at 1371–72. In deciding on the second prong of the test, the Court noted that the order 
obligated the Sacketts to undertake the expensive restoration of their property and to allow EPA 
access to the property, exposed the Sacketts to double penalties during any subsequent EPA en-
forcement action against the Sacketts, and limited the Sacketts’ ability to successfully undertake 
the permitting process because Corps practice directs that permits applied for subsequent to an 
EPA compliance order should not be granted unless doing so “is clearly appropriate.” Id. at 1372 
(citing 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e)(iv) (2012)). Although the regulation applies when enforcement litiga-
tion is brought, the government conceded and the Court noted that the same generally applies to 
compliance orders. See id. at 1372 n.3. The Court did not decide that this was an appropriate read-
ing of the regulation, but assumed that the compliance order had effectively barred the Sacketts 
from successfully permitting, thus denying them the building of their home. See id. at 1372 & n.3. 
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its underlying jurisdiction was to wait for the EPA to bring an enforcement 
action, accruing potential liability each day.34 
B. The Jurisdictional Ambiguity of the Clean Water Act 
In Sackett, the Court held that Chapter 7 provided for the Sacketts’ 
federal court appeal of the EPA compliance order issued against them, but it 
did not consider the underlying issue: whether or not the Sacketts’ land falls 
under the jurisdiction of the CWA.35 Land is subject to the regulations of the 
CWA if it comprises waters of the United States.36 The waters of the United 
States have proven difficult to define, a salient ambiguity for property own-
ers who must determine if building on their property will require expensive 
permitting through the Corps.37 
The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed agency interpretations of the wa-
ters of the United States to include navigable-in-fact waters and wetlands 
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters.38 The Court, however, has not articu-
lated a single test for assessing just how adjacent a wetland property must 
be to navigable-in-fact waters to fall under the jurisdiction of the CWA.39 In 
2006, in Rapanos v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated two 
tests to assess the reach of the CWA to wetland property, neither of which 
garnered a majority.40 Chief Justice Roberts noted his concerns, in his con-
curring opinion, that the current state of the law under the CWA leaves in-
                                                                                                                           
 34 See id. at 1372. 
 35 See id. at 1370, 1374. 
 36 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (making discharge of pollutants unlawful); id. § 1342 (providing for 
permitting of discharge into “navigable waters”); id. § 1362 (defining the regulated waters as the 
waters of the United States). If land comprises waters of the United States, it is regulated by the 
CWA and discharging any pollutants on the land (including dirt) requires permitting through the 
Corps. See id. § 1342. 
 37 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also supra note 7 and ac-
companying text (discussing the Corps’s, Supreme Court’s, and Congress’s shared difficulty of 
defining the scope of the CWA). See generally Gould, supra note 7 (discussing the impact of lack 
of Supreme Court or regulatory guidance on CWA jurisdictional determinations). The U.S. Su-
preme Court has interpreted the waters of the United States to include navigable-in-fact waters and 
wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985). 
 38 See Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 139 (affirming a regulation that construed 
freshwater wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters within the scope of the CWA). 
 39 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 40 Id. at 742 (plurality opinion) (requiring wetland waters be connected to a relatively perma-
nent waterway by a continuous surface connection to be waters of the United States within the 
meaning of the CWA); id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (requiring wetland waters have a sig-
nificant nexus to traditional navigable-in-fact waters to be waters of the United States within the 
meaning of the CWA). 
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terested parties without guidance on Congress’s intended limits on the reach 
of the CWA.41 
It is under this ambiguous analytical framework that entities doing any 
construction must assess whether or not they are required to pursue CWA 
permitting to remain in compliance with the law.42 Such parties risk (1) pro-
ceeding to fill or dredge lands without securing a permit from the CWA, 
because they do not believe their wetland property constitutes “waters of 
the United States,” when the Corps may later assess their land within the 
CWA and issue an expensive compliance order, or (2) the long and costly 
permitting process which might or might not result in a favorable permit.43 
C. The Jurisdictional Determination in Hawkes and  
Subsequent Court Filing 
In 2015, in Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether a standalone 
jurisdictional determination of the Corps is subject to Chapter 7 review.44 
The Hawkes Company, plaintiff in Hawkes, manages peat mines in North-
ern Minnesota.45 Seeking to expand their peat mining operations, the 
Hawkes Company entered into a contract to mine peat from a piece of land 
adjacent to their current mining operations and to pay the owner royalties 
for its use.46 Foreseeing the risks of permitting compliance because of wet-
lands on the property, the contract was contingent upon a favorable decision 
from the Corps that the land would be permitted under the CWA to allow 
peat mining, should the wetlands fall within the jurisdiction of the CWA.47 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that the CWA leaves parties to “feel their way on 
a case-by-case basis”). 
 42 See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370. In Justice Scalia’s words, this is “what all the fuss is about.” 
Id. 
 43 See Mark A. Latham, (Un)restoring the Chemical, Physical, and Biological Integrity of 
Our Nation’s Waters: The Emerging Clean Water Act Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 28 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 411, 435 (2010) (“[R]egulators, property owners, counsel, and the courts continue 
struggling to determine the jurisdictional reach of the CWA post-Rapanos.”). 
 44 Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 999. 
 45 Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Hawkes I), 963 F. Supp. 2d 868, 870 (D. Minn. 
2013), rev’d, 782 F.3d 994, cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 615. Peat mining is considered a wetland 
dependent operation and for that reason often occurs on lands subject to the regulations of the 
CWA. See Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 998 (noting that the Minnesota Department of Natural Re-
sources considers peat mining wetland dependent). 
 46 Hawkes I, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 870. The property itself is owned by plaintiffs Pierce Invest-
ment Company and LPF Companies. Id. All three companies are closely held corporations of the 
Pierce family. Id. 
 47 Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 998; see Hawkes I, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 870. The Corps ultimately 
determined that the wetlands on the Hawkes Company’s property were connected to a traditional 
navigable water some 120 miles away and thus fell under the purview of the CWA as a water of 
the United States. See Hawkes I, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 870–71. 
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The Corps provided the Hawkes Company with a series of preliminary 
determinations that the property fell under the jurisdiction of the CWA, 
culminating in an approved jurisdictional determination concluding that the 
property comprised waters of the United States and was therefore subject to 
the permitting requirements of the CWA.48 The Hawkes Company filed a 
timely administrative appeal contesting the jurisdictional determination.49 
The appeal was sustained and the issue was remanded for reconsideration.50 
After reconsideration, the district office issued a revised jurisdictional de-
termination again concluding that the Hawkes Company’s property was a 
water of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the CWA.51 The 
Hawkes Company then sought judicial review of the revised jurisdictional 
determination from the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, 
alleging that the Corps had erroneously concluded that the property was a 
water of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the CWA.52 
The district court granted the Corps’s motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that the revised jurisdictional determination was not a final agency action 
appropriate for judicial review.53 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the 
district court, holding the revised jurisdictional determination sufficiently 
final to be reviewable under Chapter 7 of the APA, and remanded the juris-
dictional issue to the district court.54 The U.S. Supreme Court granted the 
Corps’s petition for writ of certiorari and is scheduled to hear oral argument 
in the case during the 2016 Term.55 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Hawkes I, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 870–71. The Corps may also issue preliminary jurisdictional 
determinations, which are only advisory in nature and are not appealable through the agency’s 
internal appeals mechanism. 33 C.F.R. § 331.2. 
 49 Hawkes I, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 871; see 33 C.F.R. § 331.2 (granting by right review of ap-
proved jurisdictional determinations); id. § 331.6 (allowing sixty days for an administrative ap-
peal). 
 50 Hawkes I, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 871; Administrative Appeal Decision Hawkes Peat Company 
Inc. Jurisdictional Determination, File No. MVP 2007-01914-DJS (Oct. 24, 2012). The administra-
tive appeals officer found that the record did not support the Corps’s claim. Administrative Appeal 
Decision Hawkes Peat Company Inc. Jurisdictional Determination, File No. MVP 2007-01914-DJS 
(finding that the record did not support the Corps’s claim that the property contained waters of the 
United States). 
 51 Hawkes I, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 871. The district office is not bound to a new decision on 
appeal, but must only “further analyze” the remanded action. See 33 C.F.R. § 331.10 (2015). See 
generally 33 C.F.R. pt. 331 app. C (mapping Corps administrative appeals process for jurisdic-
tional determinations). 
 52 See Hawkes I, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 871 (seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief 
from the jurisdictional decision). 
 53 See id. at 874–75 (deciding that the jurisdictional determination failed to determine the 
rights or obligations of the plaintiffs and therefore did not meet the second prong of the Bennett 
test). 
 54 See Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1002 (holding that the jurisdictional determination meets both 
prongs of the Bennett test and is eligible for Chapter 7 review). 
 55 Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr’s, 136 S. Ct. at 615 (granting certiorari). 
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II. CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON APPLICATION OF FINALITY PRONGS TO 
JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE CWA 
Almost two decades after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in 
Bennett v. Spear outlined the test for assessing the finality of agency action 
under Chapter 7, lower courts are still struggling to apply the flexible stand-
ard to the many agency decisions made every day.56 Recently, the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits heard cases applying the Court’s 
two-pronged standard to Corps jurisdictional determinations under the CWA, 
disagreeing only as to the application of the second prong.57 Section A of this 
Part examines the Fifth Circuit’s 2014 holding in Belle Co. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers that a Corps jurisdictional determination is not a final 
agency action eligible for review under Chapter 7.58 Section B then explores 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (establishing the 
Bennett test, a two-pronged test for Chapter 7 finality). Compare Jama v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
760 F.3d 490, 497 (6th Cir. 2014) (denying Chapter 7 review of intermediate decision terminating 
refugee status by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services), and Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders 
v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (denying Fish and Wildlife Service agency protocols 
Chapter 7 review), with Sharkey v. Quarantillo, 541 F.3d 75, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) (allowing Chapter 
7 review of Immigration and Naturalization Service’s District Adjudications Officer’s cancellation 
of plaintiff’s immigration status). See generally Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of Agency 
Guidance Documents: Rethinking the Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 385–89 (2008) 
(discussing the lack of coherence in finality common law). 
 57 Compare Hawkes Co. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Hawkes II), 782 F.3d 994, 1001 (8th Cir.) 
(holding a jurisdictional determination meets the second prong of the finality test and is reviewa-
ble under Chapter 7), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (mem.), with Belle Co. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding a jurisdictional determination of the 
Corps fails to meet the second prong for finality under Chapter 7), cert. denied sub nom. Kent 
Recycling Servs. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015) (mem.). Nearly every 
court facing the issue has held that the first prong of the test, that the agency action must mark the 
consummation of the agency’s decision-making process, has been met by Corps jurisdictional 
determinations. See, e.g., Belle, 761 F.3d at 389–90 (deciding jurisdictional determination consti-
tutes consummation of agency’s decision-making process); Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the jurisdictional determi-
nation met only the first prong of the Bennett test); Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(Hawkes I), 963 F. Supp. 2d 868, 873 (D. Minn. 2013) (holding that a jurisdictional determination 
meets the first prong of the Bennett test), rev’d, 782 F.3d 994, cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 615. In 
2008, in Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that a Corps jurisdictional determination was not subject to Chap-
ter 7 review because, though it met the first prong of the finality test for agency action, it failed to 
meet the second. 543 F.3d at 593. Although the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and decision in Belle 
parallels the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, Fairbanks was heard and decided prior to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012). See Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 593; see 
also Belle, 761 F.3d at 391–92. 
 58 See infra notes 60–66 and accompanying text (examining the Fifth Circuit’s decision to 
deny Chapter 7 review of jurisdictional determinations). 
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the Eighth Circuit’s conflicting decision holding that a jurisdictional determi-
nation is final agency action reviewable under Chapter 7.59 
A. Fifth Circuit Holds Jurisdictional Determinations Are Merely 
Notifications, Not Final Agency Actions 
In Belle, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the 
Corps’s jurisdictional determination failed to meet the Supreme Court’s 
two-pronged test for Chapter 7 final agency action.60 The Fifth Circuit held 
that while the first Bennett prong was met, the second prong was not.61 
In rejecting the Belle Company’s claim that the Corps’s final jurisdic-
tional determination was an action by which rights or obligations had been 
determined or from which legal obligations would flow, the Fifth Circuit 
focused on the pre-enforcement nature of the jurisdictional determination.62 
The compliance order issued by the Corps and evaluated in the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s 2012 decision in Sackett v. EPA obligated the Sacketts to a 
remedial plan and assigned penalties to the family.63 No such obligations 
flowed from the jurisdictional determination itself to the Belle Company, as 
the jurisdictional determination resolved only that the Belle Company’s 
property was subject to the CWA but not that the CWA had been violated.64 
The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the notion that the requirements of 
permitting were a legal obligation that flowed from the jurisdictional deter-
mination.65 The court noted that the legal obligations of permitting flowed 
directly from the CWA and that the jurisdictional determination of the 
Corps did no more than alert the Belle Company to those obligations.66 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See infra notes 67–72 and accompanying text (evaluating the Eight Circuit’s decision to 
allow Chapter 7 review of jurisdictional determinations). 
 60 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 394 (holding a jurisdictional determination of the Corps fails to meet 
the second prong for finality under Chapter 7). 
 61 Belle, 761 F.3d at 390 (deciding the jurisdictional determination marked the consummation 
of the agency’s decision-making process), 394 (deciding the jurisdictional determination did not 
determine the plaintiff’s rights or obligations under the CWA). 
 62 See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370 (relying on the consequences of a compliance order rather 
than the jurisdictional finding); Belle, 761 F.3d at 393 (distinguishing a jurisdictional determina-
tion underlying a compliance order from the directives of such compliance order). 
 63 Belle, 761 F.3d at 391. The Fifth Circuit considered the four obligations that the U.S. Su-
preme Court noted flowed from the compliance order issued in Sackett: a requirement that the 
Sacketts take immediate remedial action on their property, the doubling of the penalty for the 
Sacketts’s CWA violation, the reduced likelihood that the Sacketts would receive a permit to 
build, and the determinations both that the Sacketts’s property included wetlands and that those 
wetlands had been improperly filled. See id. at 391–94 (citing Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371–72). 
 64 See id. at 393. 
 65 Id. at 391 (“We are cognizant that the Corps’s permitting process can be costly for regulat-
ed parties.”). 
 66 See id. (stating that the effect of the Corps’s jurisdictional determination was to notify the 
Belle Company of their obligations under the CWA). 
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B. Eighth Circuit Holds Jurisdictional Determinations Sufficiently Final for 
Review Focusing on Costs and Risks of Permitting Process 
Conversely, in 2015, in Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided that a ju-
risdictional determination from the Corps satisfies both the first and second 
prongs of the Bennett test and is entitled to Chapter 7 review.67 The Eighth 
Circuit, concerned by the costs and risks of the CWA permitting process, 
held that a jurisdictional determination sufficiently allocates legal rights and 
obligations, thus satisfying the second prong of the Bennett test.68 The 
Eighth Circuit declined to follow both the district court’s rejection of the 
costs of permitting as a legal obligation unto themselves and the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning in Belle.69 
In its analysis, the Eighth Circuit cited four prior U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions affirming pre-enforcement judicial review of agency actions in 
other regulatory schemes.70 In each of these cases, the agency action in 
question left the party with a choice of massive compliance costs or a sub-
stantial risk of enforcement costs.71 The Eighth Circuit extended these deci-
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1002 (holding Corps jurisdictional determination reviewable 
under Chapter 7 prior to enforcement). 
 68 See id. at 1001. The Eighth Circuit was concerned with the risks and costs associated with 
permitting discussed by Justice Scalia in his 2006 plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States. See 
id. (citing 547 U.S. 715, 719 (2006) (plurality opinion)). On average, securing the appropriate permits 
takes 788 days and costs parties $271,596. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (citing Sunding & Zilberman, 
supra note 6, at 74–76). The Hawkes Company anticipated it would spend more than $100,000 in 
preparing the ten necessary ecological assessments to undertake the permitting process. See Amend-
ed Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 44, Hawkes I, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (No. 0:13-
cv-00107). 
 69 See Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 996 (noting disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and 
decision in Belle); id. at 1000 (disagreeing with the district court’s analysis of the second Bennett 
prong).  
 70 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152–53 (1967) (allowing judicial review of 
Commissioner of Food and Drugs regulation that made vague the requirements for what drugs 
required labeling); Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 43–44 (1956) (allowing 
judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission’s directive that certain commodities could 
not be exempt from permitting requirements); Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 
407, 422 (1942) (allowing immediate review of regulations not yet enforced against any parties); 
Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1000–01 (citing Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158, 178 (holding a Fish and Wildlife 
Service biological opinion final because it altered the relevant legal regime)). 
 71 See Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1000–01. The Eighth Circuit framed the decision for the 
Hawkes Company as one between massive and risky permitting costs and the risk of substantial 
civil fines for violation. See id. at 1001. In the cases the Eighth Circuit cited, the plaintiffs were 
left facing messy regulatory schemes, unsure of whether they could proceed lawfully or if they 
would be liable for expensive sanctions. See id. at 1000–01 (citing Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158, 178 
(allowing Chapter 7 review of Fish and Wildlife Service biological opinion that altered the rele-
vant legal regime); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152–53 (allowing Chapter 7 review of Commissioner 
of Food and Drugs regulation that unsettled the law for required drug bottle labeling); Frozen 
Food Express, 351 U.S. at 43–44 (holding Interstate Commerce Commission’s directive that cer-
2016] Eighth Circuit’s Misapprehension of APA Purposes 13 
sions to the CWA, holding that exactly such a dilemma existed for the 
Hawkes Company and that therefore Chapter 7 review is available for juris-
dictional determinations.72 
III. REVERSING THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ON APPEAL 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit inappropri-
ately focused on the burdens of the CWA permitting process in holding in 
2015 in Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that a Corps jurisdic-
tional determination warrants Chapter 7 review.73 The U.S. Supreme Court 
should reverse the Eighth Circuit’s decision.74 Jurisdictional determinations 
do not impose permitting burdens.75 It is the CWA, ambiguous CWA juris-
dictional law, and the characteristics of a piece of property that impose per-
mitting burdens.76 The Eighth Circuit’s misapprehension of the origin of the 
permitting obligations led them to misapply the second prong of the test 
outlined in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Bennett v. Spear, and 
to incorrectly allow Chapter 7 judicial review of the Corps’s jurisdictional 
determination.77 Future courts should follow the reasoning the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit articulated in 2014 in Belle Co. v. U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
tain commodities could not be exempt from permitting requirements reviewable under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act); Columbia Broad. Sys., 316 U.S. at 422 (allowing judicial review of regu-
lations not yet enforced where legal consequences attach to the agency action)). The Eighth Cir-
cuit reasoned that current CWA jurisdictional law mimics these messy regulatory schemes. See 
Columbia Broad. Sys., 316 U.S. at 422 (allowing judicial review of regulations not yet enforced 
where legal consequences attached to the agency action); Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1000–01. 
 72 See Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1000–01 (framing the assertion of CWA jurisdiction as a choice 
between compliance costs or enforcement risk); cf. Theodore L. Garrett, Sacketts Win Right to 
Pre-Enforcement Review: A Victory for “Ordinary Americans,” NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, 
Spring 2014, at *3, *3–5 (discussing the oral argument in Sackett to the same effect). 
 73 See Hawkes Co. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Hawkes II), 782 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (mem.); Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 
390–94 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying pre-enforcement Chapter 7 review of Corps jurisdictional deter-
mination), cert. denied sub nom. Kent Recycling Servs. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. Ct. 
1548 (2015) (mem.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13–14, Hawkes II, 782 F.3d 994 (No. 15-
290) [hereinafter Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (“The jurisdictional determination does 
not create the quandary that concerned the court . . . .”). 
 74 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 391 (determining that a jurisdictional determination is not subject to 
Chapter 7 review as final agency action); Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, 
at 14 (arguing that Chapter 7 review of jurisdictional determinations is incorrect). 
 75 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 391; Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 14. 
 76 See Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 586, 596 n.11 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“Yet, we must keep in mind that these are the costs of statutory compliance with the 
CWA.”); Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 14 (arguing that a property 
owner faces the same options under the CWA regardless of whether they have or have not re-
ceived a jurisdictional determination from the Corps); cf. Garrett, supra note 72, at *3–5 (discuss-
ing the costs of the permitting process under the CWA). 
 77 See Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 594, 596 n.11. Contra Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1001 (“The ad-
verse effect is caused by agency action, not simply by the existence of the CWA.”). 
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Army Corps of Engineers and deny judicial review of jurisdictional deter-
minations.78 
Because permitting requirements flow directly from the CWA to prop-
erty, the Eighth Circuit should not have factored permitting costs into their 
analysis of the second Bennett prong.79 The Eighth Circuit factored the 
costs and risks of permitting into their analysis of the legal obligations flow-
ing from a Corps jurisdictional determination.80 The costs and risks of per-
mitting, however, do not flow from a Corps jurisdictional determination.81 
Rather, permitting requirements flow directly from the CWA to a piece of 
property.82 A jurisdictional determination does not alter the legal obligations 
of a party, but merely alerts them to their obligations under the CWA.83 
The U.S. Supreme Court should follow the reasoning of the Fifth Cir-
cuit and deny Chapter 7 review of Corps jurisdictional determinations.84 In 
Belle, the Fifth Circuit correctly held that a Corps jurisdictional determina-
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 390–94 (denying pre-enforcement Chapter 7 review of Corps juris-
dictional determination); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12–14, Belle Co., 761 F.3d 383 
(No. 14-493) (arguing Fifth Circuit decision denying judicial review is correct); Rita Ann Cicero, 
Supreme Court Will Decide Jurisdictional Question in Clean Water Act Case, 36 WESTLAW J. 
ENVTL., no. 11, 2015, at *1, *2 (explaining Corps argument to deny review). 
 79 See Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 594, 596 n.11. Contra Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1001. 
 80 Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1001. Permitting under the CWA poses many risks: it is expensive in 
time and money, it may or may not be successful, and a party may choose to take it on only to find 
that their property never required permitting in the first place. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 
U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion); id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also Gould, 
supra note 7, at 423–49 (discussing the ambiguity of CWA jurisdictional law and its impact); 
Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 6, at 74–76 (studying the time and expense of the CWA permit-
ting process). 
 81 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 391 (“But even if Belle had never requested the [jurisdictional de-
termination] and instead had begun to fill, it would not have been immune to enforcement action 
by the Corps or EPA.”); Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 594 (“[The plaintiff’s] legal obligations arise 
directly and solely from the CWA, and not from the Corps’s issuance of an approved jurisdictional 
determination.”); Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 14. The legal quanda-
ry that the Eighth Circuit attributes to the jurisdictional determination is more likely the result of 
vague and inconsistent promulgated regulations. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring); Gould, supra note 7, at 449 (stating the jurisdictional determination process could be 
clarified by regulation, legislation, or the Supreme Court); cf. Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certi-
orari, supra note 73, at 10–11 (discussing the effect of newly promulgated Corps regulations). 
Following a multi-year process, and published after the Hawkes II decision, the Corps and the 
EPA issued a new rule clarifying the agencies’ interpretation of the scope of the waters covered in 
the CWA, considering the statute and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Definition of 
Waters of the United States, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,055, 37,105 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3 (2015)). The new rule is intended to provide guidance on assessing the reach of the CWA 
to one’s own property. See id. at 37,055 (explaining the intent, authority, and scope of the new 
rule). 
 82 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 391; Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 594; Hawkes II Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 73, at 14. The reach of Congress’s CWA to an entity’s land imposes these 
costs with or without notice from the Corps. See Belle, 761 F.3d at 391. 
 83 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 391. 
 84 See id. at 390–94; Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 14. 
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tion is not a final agency action appropriate for Chapter 7 judicial review 
because jurisdictional determinations serve only as notification to a party 
that their land is subject to the regulations of the CWA but do not assign any 
penalties or duties to a property owner.85 Because an interested party’s legal 
obligations under the CWA are not altered by a jurisdictional determination, 
it is correct to deny Chapter 7 review of jurisdictional determinations.86 
Finally, Chapter 7 review of jurisdictional determinations would allow 
duplicative judicial review of agency action, an outcome never contemplat-
ed by the APA scheme.87 Chapter 7 review of jurisdictional determinations 
inappropriately relies on costly ambiguities in CWA jurisdictional law, a 
problem better solved by legislation, regulation, or judicial decision than 
untimely review.88 The decision to consider a jurisdictional determination 
final agency action under Chapter 7 as a remedy for ambiguous CWA law 
only serves to complicate APA jurisprudence.89 Future courts should follow 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 391 (noting that the jurisdictional determination is a notice giving 
instrument); see also Fairbanks, 543 F.3d at 595 n.10 (“By contrast, the Corps’s approved juris-
dictional determination imposes no new or additional legal obligations on Fairbanks. It at most 
‘simply reminds affected parties of existing duties’ imposed by the CWA itself and commands 
nothing of its own accord.” (quoting Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 876 
n.153 (D.C. Cir. 1979))); Alex Horowitz, Army Corps’ Wetlands Determination Not Subject to 
Court Review, Panel Says (C.A.5), WESTLAW ENERGY & ENV’T DAILY BRIEFING, Aug. 7, 2014, 
2014 WL 3858373 (clarifying the Fifth Circuit’s precedential analysis in the Belle Company dis-
pute). The Fifth Circuit noted that the land would be subject, as a matter of fact, to permitting bur-
dens without any Corps action if the land comprises waters of the United States. Belle, 761 F.3d at 
394. Contra Hawkes II, 782 F.3d at 1001 (“The adverse effect is caused by agency action, not 
simply by the existence of the CWA.”). 
 86 Belle, 761 F.3d at 394 (holding that a jurisdictional determination fails to meet the second 
prong of the test outlined in Bennett v. Spear); see also Horowitz, supra note 85 (explaining the 
Fifth Circuit’s denial of Chapter 7 review). 
 87 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 394 (“Congress did not intend the general grant of review in the APA 
to duplicate existing procedures for review of agency action.” (quoting Beall v. United States, 336 
F.3d 419, 427 n.9 (5th Cir. 2003))); Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 22. 
The court in Belle held that allowing a party to seek judicial review of the Corps’s wetlands deci-
sion at the jurisdictional determination phase and to later allow judicial reassessment of that same 
decision when appealing a permitting decision would disrupt the APA’s regulatory review system. 
761 F.3d at 394; see also Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 21–22 (argu-
ing that judicial review of standalone jurisdictional determinations would disrupt the Corps’s abil-
ity to assess whether a property owner might be exempt from permitting requirements, even when 
subject to the CWA’s reach, before unnecessary and protracted litigation of the jurisdiction en-
sues). 
 88 See Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 22; cf. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 
758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining the regulatory and judicial trouble with defining the 
reach of the CWA). 
 89 See Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (allowing Chapter 
7 review of an EPA compliance order but noting that “only clarification of the reach of the Clean 
Water Act can rectify the underlying problem”); Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 73, at 22 (arguing that judicial review of jurisdictional determinations will not resolve the 
issue of CWA coverage). Chapter 7 review of jurisdictional determinations at this early stage 
would be reviewed under the deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard whereas suits brought 
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the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit and deny Chapter 7 review of jurisdiction-
al determinations.90 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 should not pro-
vide judicial review to jurisdictional determinations made by the Army 
Corps of Engineers when enforcing the Clean Water Act of 1977. The 
Eighth Circuit inappropriately considered the costs and risks of the Clean 
Water Act in allowing such review in Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers. The vagaries of the Clean Water Act’s reach should not be used 
to provide judicial review for agency action never otherwise intended to be 
captured by Chapter 7 review. Future courts should follow the analysis of 
the Fifth Circuit when applying the requirements of Chapter 7 review to 
Corps jurisdictional determinations. The U.S. Supreme Court should re-
verse the Eighth Circuit’s decision and deny judicial review of Corps juris-
dictional determinations as final agency action. 
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when challenging a permitting decision would be reviewed under the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. See Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, at 22. This would 
create two distinct lines of cases and lead to duplicative judicial review. See id. 
 90 See Belle, 761 F.3d at 390–94; cf. Hawkes II Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 73, 
at 14 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should deny judicial review of jurisdictional determi-
nations). 
